A Gamble

7 January 2010



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"Hu and Medvedev Agreement and the Fate of the Russian Far East"

by Dmimtry Shlapentokh, PhD, Associate Professor of History, Indiana University, South Bend


Russian Siberia and the Far East were populated and industrialized only because of the strong authoritarian and totalitarian governments of the czars and Communist leaders. They are the ones who sent convicts, encouraged migration, and invested huge funds to industrialize the area. With the collapse of the USSR, the props of the centralized totalitarian machine collapsed; and nothing emerged to replace them despite the endless affirmation of the people in the Kremlin that keeping the territories in the east from the Urals was absolutely essential. Still, the decay started almost a generation ago and became so apparent that even Dmitry Medvedev in one of his trips to the Far East some time ago acknowledged this.

Despite a windfall of oil/gas money throughout Putin’s tenure nothing was done and with the sharp decline of oil/gas prices, the search for future investments had practically dried up or, at least, made Moscow even more reluctant to invest in the Far East. And a search for foreign sponsors had emerged in the mind of Russian elite. Naturally, China was considered as the most logical option because of its proximity and its interests in Far Eastern resources. Several projects emerged in the minds of the Russian elite as to how to entice China to engage in the development of the Far East. One of them was put forward a few months ago and implied leasing at least half of Vladivostok to China for several generations. The plan led to a public outcry and was shelved.

Still, a new plan emerged and seems to have been clinched by Medvedev in his September meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao, at least according to Vedomosti, a respectable Russian news vehicle. According to the plan, China would engage in the funding and development of natural resources in the Far East and Siberia. The enterprise would employ a mostly Chinese work force. As to reducing the fear of creeping Chinaization of the region and, implicitly, future annexation of the area by China, a provision of the agreement stated that the Chinese workers should have only temporary visas and even return to China by the end of the work day.

Some members of the Russian public, especially those with nationalistic views, regarded the plan as the manifestation of Moscow treachery and the selling out of Russia. They asserted—and not without grounds––that no provision or visa limitations would prevent increasing numbers of Chinese in the region and its final absorption by China. Still, the major threat for Russia’s territorial integrity could be not a multitude of Chinese overwhelming Russia, but Russians themselves, at least the residents of the Far East. Increasing economic ties with China would inevitably drive them toward Beijing, not toward Moscow.

This trend could well be illustrated by the view of one Russian businessman, whom I met in Shanghai’s airport. The man started his acquaintance with me with a joke that he was a nice and broad-minded person and he hated only “blacks and racism.” He seems hardly to subscribe to “multiculturalism,” the essential profession of faith in American academia, media and government. He also admitted that he did not much like the Chinese and wished to go to the USA; its major attraction, at least in his view, is that it is still a country mostly of the white man. Still, he acknowledged that his entire life is connected with China. He engages there in business, buying real estate, and traveling; and he has friends, or at least, acquaintances there––and all of this without the knowledge of any Chinese language. It was clear that China presented for him a powerful economic magnet; and he acknowledged this, although, reluctantly. He is hardly alone.
In one TV discussion regarding China and the Chinese that I watched during my recent trip to Russia, some, calling from Moscow, blasted the authorities for letting thousands of Chinese trade at the Cherkizov market. The Chinese are seen here as a sort demographic l foe, potentially politically dangerous. This same point was made by a caller from St. Petersburg who blasted the local authorities for permitting the Chinese to create a Chinatown of sorts. Still, another caller from the Far East struck a very different tone. He stated that quite a few graduates in the Far East could not find a job and moved to China where they were employed. He also noted that those Russians who came to China were not discriminated against or mistreated by the Chinese.

Western pundits might agree that powerful economic forces could well pull the residents of the Russian Far East to China. Still, they would proclaim that Russians would never surrender themselves to the despotic rule of Beijing. Russians did not shake off their native Communist rule just to be enslaved by another, foreign, Communist monster. They would add that the craving for freedom is the most essential desire of all human beings. One should take this assumption with a grain of salt. Even in the USA—now in deep depression, regardless of all the proclamations of officials––the millions of unemployed are concerned not with liberty but how to get their daily bread. Even less, are liberty or democracy of interest to most Russians, including those who reside in the Far East. For them, democracy is nothing but a fight of various cliques: the rich for their turf, and corrupted bureaucracy to fleece the masses.

Logically, enlightened Chinese despotism and tough dealing with corrupted bureaucracy evokes in the minds of these individuals nothing but praise that the Chinese government periodically purges the bureaucracy so as to instill in the bureaucratic mind a solitary fear; and, as one man implied, he would be quite happy to see such treatment of the Russian bureaucrats. Another Russian acquaintance expressed the same admiration for the tough treatment of Chinese bureaucratic authorities, whose behavior is quite different from that of Russians.

This sort of natural attraction to China would increase in the case of continuous China economic advancement and the related image of China in the minds of Russians from the Far East not with still predominately poor and unkempt Chinese migrant workers but with prosperous businessmen. The gravitation to China could be increased by continuous  Moscow policy of treatment of Far East as colony of sort. The residents of the Far East see Moscow as an imperial power that cynically exploits the Far East and prevents Far Easterners from engaging in profitable trade with their neighbors; and they state that it was not surprising that in 2009, when demonstrators in Vladivostok protested a ban on the import of Japanese cars, some carried a banner, “Give Vladivostok to Japan.”

One, of course, could note that increasing economic and later, inevitable political gravitation of the Russian Far East and Siberia to China would hardly please neither Moscow nor Washington. The people on the Potomac like to juxtapose the USA to a sinking Russian ship, the point made recently by American vice-president Joe Biden. Still, the USA battleship is sinking in unison with Russia, and the USA's deep structural economic problems are unsolvable in the context of the market capitalism of America, regardless of the political affiliation of the occupant of the White House. Thus as the decline of the USA proceeds, it could do hardly anything even on Moscow request.

While evaluating the Russian-Chinese agreement, one should, of course, remember that in the case of Russia nothing is set in stone; and Moscow could either cancel the agreement or “reinterpret” it in various ways. Still, regardless of the actual outcome of this particular agreement, it clearly indicates the direction of the future of Russia’s Far East and possibly part of Asia, which in the long run might be the web of states dependent on the ultimate economic and geopolitical overlord, China, as it had been for centuries before the advent of the West.Hu and Medvedev Agreement and the Fate of the Russian Far East by Dmimtry Shlapentokh, PhD, Associate Professor of History, Indiana University, South Bend

Russian Siberia and the Far East were populated and industrialized only because of the strong authoritarian and totalitarian governments of the czars and Communist leaders. They are the ones who sent convicts, encouraged migration, and invested huge funds to industrialize the area. With the collapse of the USSR, the props of the centralized totalitarian machine collapsed; and nothing emerged to replace them despite the endless affirmation of the people in the Kremlin that keeping the territories in the east from the Urals was absolutely essential. Still, the decay started almost a generation ago and became so apparent that even Dmitry Medvedev in one of his trips to the Far East some time ago acknowledged this.

Despite a windfall of oil/gas money throughout Putin’s tenure nothing was done and with the sharp decline of oil/gas prices, the search for future investments had practically dried up or, at least, made Moscow even more reluctant to invest in the Far East. And a search for foreign sponsors had emerged in the mind of Russian elite. Naturally, China was considered as the most logical option because of its proximity and its interests in Far Eastern resources. Several projects emerged in the minds of the Russian elite as to how to entice China to engage in the development of the Far East. One of them was put forward a few months ago and implied leasing at least half of Vladivostok to China for several generations. The plan led to a public outcry and was shelved.

Still, a new plan emerged and seems to have been clinched by Medvedev in his September meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao, at least according to Vedomosti, a respectable Russian news vehicle. According to the plan, China would engage in the funding and development of natural resources in the Far East and Siberia. The enterprise would employ a mostly Chinese work force. As to reducing the fear of creeping Chinaization of the region and, implicitly, future annexation of the area by China, a provision of the agreement stated that the Chinese workers should have only temporary visas and even return to China by the end of the work day.

Some members of the Russian public, especially those with nationalistic views, regarded the plan as the manifestation of Moscow treachery and the selling out of Russia. They asserted—and not without grounds––that no provision or visa limitations would prevent increasing numbers of Chinese in the region and its final absorption by China. Still, the major threat for Russia’s territorial integrity could be not a multitude of Chinese overwhelming Russia, but Russians themselves, at least the residents of the Far East. Increasing economic ties with China would inevitably drive them toward Beijing, not toward Moscow.

This trend could well be illustrated by the view of one Russian businessman, whom I met in Shanghai’s airport. The man started his acquaintance with me with a joke that he was a nice and broad-minded person and he hated only “blacks and racism.” He seems hardly to subscribe to “multiculturalism,” the essential profession of faith in American academia, media and government. He also admitted that he did not much like the Chinese and wished to go to the USA; its major attraction, at least in his view, is that it is still a country mostly of the white man. Still, he acknowledged that his entire life is connected with China. He engages there in business, buying real estate, and traveling; and he has friends, or at least, acquaintances there––and all of this without the knowledge of any Chinese language. It was clear that China presented for him a powerful economic magnet; and he acknowledged this, although, reluctantly. He is hardly alone.
In one TV discussion regarding China and the Chinese that I watched during my recent trip to Russia, some, calling from Moscow, blasted the authorities for letting thousands of Chinese trade at the Cherkizov market. The Chinese are seen here as a sort demographic l foe, potentially politically dangerous. This same point was made by a caller from St. Petersburg who blasted the local authorities for permitting the Chinese to create a Chinatown of sorts. Still, another caller from the Far East struck a very different tone. He stated that quite a few graduates in the Far East could not find a job and moved to China where they were employed. He also noted that those Russians who came to China were not discriminated against or mistreated by the Chinese.

Western pundits might agree that powerful economic forces could well pull the residents of the Russian Far East to China. Still, they would proclaim that Russians would never surrender themselves to the despotic rule of Beijing. Russians did not shake off their native Communist rule just to be enslaved by another, foreign, Communist monster. They would add that the craving for freedom is the most essential desire of all human beings. One should take this assumption with a grain of salt. Even in the USA—now in deep depression, regardless of all the proclamations of officials––the millions of unemployed are concerned not with liberty but how to get their daily bread. Even less, are liberty or democracy of interest to most Russians, including those who reside in the Far East. For them, democracy is nothing but a fight of various cliques: the rich for their turf, and corrupted bureaucracy to fleece the masses.

Logically, enlightened Chinese despotism and tough dealing with corrupted bureaucracy evokes in the minds of these individuals nothing but praise that the Chinese government periodically purges the bureaucracy so as to instill in the bureaucratic mind a solitary fear; and, as one man implied, he would be quite happy to see such treatment of the Russian bureaucrats. Another Russian acquaintance expressed the same admiration for the tough treatment of Chinese bureaucratic authorities, whose behavior is quite different from that of Russians.

This sort of natural attraction to China would increase in the case of continuous China economic advancement and the related image of China in the minds of Russians from the Far East not with still predominately poor and unkempt Chinese migrant workers but with prosperous businessmen. The gravitation to China could be increased by continuous  Moscow policy of treatment of Far East as colony of sort. The residents of the Far East see Moscow as an imperial power that cynically exploits the Far East and prevents Far Easterners from engaging in profitable trade with their neighbors; and they state that it was not surprising that in 2009, when demonstrators in Vladivostok protested a ban on the import of Japanese cars, some carried a banner, “Give Vladivostok to Japan.”

One, of course, could note that increasing economic and later, inevitable political gravitation of the Russian Far East and Siberia to China would hardly please neither Moscow nor Washington. The people on the Potomac like to juxtapose the USA to a sinking Russian ship, the point made recently by American vice-president Joe Biden. Still, the USA battleship is sinking in unison with Russia, and the USA's deep structural economic problems are unsolvable in the context of the market capitalism of America, regardless of the political affiliation of the occupant of the White House. Thus as the decline of the USA proceeds, it could do hardly anything even on Moscow request.

While evaluating the Russian-Chinese agreement, one should, of course, remember that in the case of Russia nothing is set in stone; and Moscow could either cancel the agreement or “reinterpret” it in various ways. Still, regardless of the actual outcome of this particular agreement, it clearly indicates the direction of the future of Russia’s Far East and possibly part of Asia, which in the long run might be the web of states dependent on the ultimate economic and geopolitical overlord, China, as it had been for centuries before the advent of the West. © Copyright 2010 by Dmimtry Shlapentokh, PhD, published with the permission of the author.

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