Terror Report Ideas Will Not Improve Security

Later today, the White House will release a declassified version of the first report on the attempted plane bombing Christmas Day. It will likely recap most of what the press has already reported, and it may offer a few changes to the way things are done. However, the changes that need to be made are unlikely to occur anytime soon.

The president himself assessed the situation accurately, "This was a screw-up that could have been disastrous. We dodged a bullet but just barely," the White House quoted him as telling the security chiefs. "It was averted by brave individuals not because the system worked, and that is not acceptable." He called it a "screw up."

Some of the problem is bureaucratic. The US has no fewer than 16 entities composing its intelligence community. The overlap is immense and some of it is downright unnecessary. Quite why the Coast Guard has its own intelligence agency makes no sense when the Navy does as well, in addition to the Army, the Air Force and Marine Corps, all of which are distinct from the Defense Intelligence Agency. Uniting all of these makes sense. On the other hand, the Department of Energy doesn't need an Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at all. Competition in intelligence prevents sharing of information. The fewer agencies the better, but that won't happen due to too many vested interests opposing it.

Nevertheless, the real problem is not bureaucratic, though, but a matter of personnel. The underpants bomber paid cash for a one-way ticket and checked no luggage, but no one thought to search him. This is the exact same problem America had on September 11, 2001. What if someone at Logan Airport had said, "Excuse me, Mr. Atta, but you can't get on the plane with that box cutter?" The plot would have failed.

Instead of making an effort to improve the training and professionalism of the people protecting airports and other soft targets, the US will spend billions on useless technology in an effort to keep the last bomber off the plane and not the next one. There is no such thing as 100% security, but there is such a thing as 100% incompetence. More machines and more agencies won't fix anything. The human element is the critical one, and that calls actually for fewer machines and less bureaucracy.

© Copyright 2010 by The Kensington Review, Jeff Myhre, PhD, Editor. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written consent. Produced using Ubuntu Linux.

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