North Korean Succession Speculation Yields Little Insight

Back in the good old days of the Cold War, a subset of the political science profession specialized in guessing the power arrangements of the Soviet Union. Relying on such scientific devices as finding out who stood where on Lenin's tomb on May 1, Kremlinologists offered the world a unique insight into the machinations of the secretive regime. Except they were often wrong, and even when they were right, their observations were of little value. Much the same is now going on with regard to the North Korean succession issue.

One hopes that the term coined by The Economist, Pyongyangologist, doesn't stick, but the field does need a name, perhaps Kim-ology? In any event, it is clear that the regime in North Korea is facing some kind of power transition because the Dear Leader Kim Jong Il is 68 and in less-than-perfect health. This week's meeting of the Korean Workers' Party (the first in 30 years) to "elect the supreme leadership body" of the party is a rare enough event to suggest some estate planning is in the works.

Most of the speculation focuses on The Brilliant Comrade, the nickname of dictator Kim's third son Kim Jong Un. Apparently, this youngest son of the dictator is being groomed to take over (his older 2 brothers being unfit for reasons one cannot discern). Being 27 or 28, he's a bit young, but nevertheless, he was made a 4-star general in the army, deputy chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party, and a member of the Central Committee. Readers are encouraged to insert a resume padding joke here.

At the same time, his auntie Kim Kyong-hui, was also made a general, as well as a member of the politburo. Her husband, Chang Song-taek, is head of the National Defense Commission. In other words, they are now positioned to act as regents should old man Kim kick the bucket soon. Meanwhile, the Young Un will build a power base in the army and the party so that in 10 years or so, his relatives will be unnecessary (and old enough to retire gracefully).

But so what? There is absolutely no evidence that this transition will result in new policies or behaviors. Indeed, one may be justified in thinking this transitional plan ensures more of the same for another generation. In the Kremlin, there were hard-liners and reformers (Mr. Andropov was rather different from Mr. Yeltsin). In North Korea, any reformers are very well concealed, if they exist at all.

The only point of interest for those outside North Korea is the possibility of a stable Korean peninsula if the transition goes smoothly. Should a general decide the Kim family must go so that his own glory can shine, the situation becomes very difficult. If power can flow to the Young Un, or someone else, without upheaval, violence and miscalculation can be avoided. Bearing in mind that North Korea has a military of 1.5 million, crude nuclear weapons and conventional artillery that can hit the South Korean capital Seoul with ease, miscalculation is the last thing the world needs.

© Copyright 2010 by The Kensington Review, Jeff Myhre, PhD, Editor. No part of this publication may be reproduced without written consent. Produced using Ubuntu Linux.

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